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CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF ACTION 
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN 
In any generation there are relatively few people who make major 
original contributions to even a single area of philosophy. But the 
man whose work is the topic of this conference has made such 
contributions not only in a single field, but in several. This morning 
and afternoon we have devoted our attention to Chisholm's epis- 
temology, the breadth and significance of  which is evident. Equally 
deserving of our attention, however, are his contributions to the 
theory of action and metaphysics, and we shall be turning to these 
topics this evening and tomorrow. As in epistemology, Chisholm's 
work in these areas has focused on the deepest philosophical 
problems. He has worked out suggested solutions to these problems 
with a scope, precision, and care which serve as models for others to 
emulate. 
1. Sketch of  Chisholm's Position 
Chisholm's theory of action and agency begins, of course, with 
the question of freedom and determinism, or rather, as he formu- 
lates it, the problem of responsibility and determinism. The problem 
is that responsibility seems to conflict both with determinism and 
with indeterminism. It conflicts with determinism since an agent is 
responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise; and 
he could have done otherwise only if his action was not causally 
determined by prior events, even internal events such as his own 
desires and beliefs. On the other hand, it conflicts with indeter- 
minism as well. If the action is not caused at all, if it is fortuitous or 
capricious, merely happening "out of the blue," then again the agent 
cannot be responsible for it. Chisholm's solution is to distinguish 
between two kinds of causation: agent-causation and event- 
causation. If a man is responsible for a deed, says Chisholm, there is 
some event that is not caused by other events and states of affairs, 
but is caused by the man or agent himself. Such an event is not 
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causally determined by previous events, but neither is it wholly 
uncaused. This, says Chisholm, allows for ascriptions of  respon- 
sibility. 
Chisholm's theory of  action, then, centers on his account of  
agent-causation. The locution he uses to express agent-causation, 
however, is introduced as a primitive, undefined expression. This is 
the expression 'S makes it happen that p in the endeavor to make it 
happen that q.' To grasp the theory he puts forward, one must 
examine the axioms that govern this locution, the way he uses it to 
define other expressions in our language of  action and purpose, and 
the illustrations he gives of  the applications of  these expressions. ~ 
There is little point, however, in my reviewing all of  these axioms, 
definitions, and illustrations, or even very many of them, partly 
because they are doubtless familiar to most members of the audience 
and partly because any attempt to do justice to their richness would 
exceed the time which an after-dinner speaker should be accorded. 
Instead, let me try to sketch a picture of  human action which I think 
emerges from Chisholm's def'mitions, illustrations, and announced 
philosophical motivation. In the course of  this sketch I shall refer to 
a few of  his def'mitions and axioms, but I make no pretense to 
completeness. Moreover, I shall sometimes give my own examples, 
and hazard conjectures about the reasons for certain moves which 
Chisholm himself may not give. 
Let us begin with a simple case. Suppose that Smith's arm is 
paralyzed, but, unaware of this, Smith tries to raise his arm. What 
does this trying consist in? If I understand Chisholm's theory 
correctly, he would say that it consists in the following: Smith 
makes a certain neural event happen in the endeavor to make it 
happen that his arm rise. This example illustrates two features of 
Chisholm's agency locution. First, to say that S makes it happen that 
p in the endeavor to make it happen that q entails that S does make 
it happen that p; so p obtains. Second, to say that S makes it happen 
that p in the endeavor to make it happen that q does not entail that 
q obtains. These principles are exemplified in our case: Smith does 
make it happen that the neural event occurs but, being paralyzed, his 
arm does not rise. The example also illustrates another feature of 
Chisholm's locution, viz., that S earl make p happen in the endeavor 
to make q happen without knowing or suspecting that he makes p 
happen, and without intending or endeavoring to make p happen. In 
our example, we suppose that Smith neither intends nor realizes that 
the neural event in question occurs (or that he makes it occur). 
584 
CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF ACTION 
Now let us turn to a second case. Suppose that Smith's arm is not 
paralyzed, and that he succeeds in making it rise. Suppose, more- 
over, that this deed of  Smith's is one for which we think he is 
responsible. Then since responsibility precludes determinism, 
according to Chisholm, we must suppose that Smith's deed is not 
determined by prior events. Yet it seems clearly false to maintain 
that the rising of his arm is not causally determined by prior events; 
surely it is causally determined by such prior events as the con- 
traction of certain muscles. Chisholm does not deny this. Rather, he 
construes Smith's deed or action as starting with the (first) neural 
event which he makes happen in the endeavor to make his arm rise. 
Although the rising of  the arm is causally determined by prior 
events, this neural event is not so determined. It does not follow, of  
course, that the neural event is uncaused; on the contrary, it is 
caused by Smith himself. We have here a paradigm instance of pure 
agent-causation, unaccompanied by event-causation. Of course, 
neurophysiologists might contend that there are no cerebral events 
that are not determined by preceding events, any more than there 
are arm risings that are not causally determined by muscle contract- 
hags. But perhaps Chisholm does not claim that there actually are 
any instances of  neural events which are caused by agents but not 
events. Perhaps he is only claiming that there are such events if  we 
are ever responsible for our deeds. But he certainly appears to 
believe that we are sometimes responsible for our deeds. 
At this point a clever critic might point out that although 
Chisholm's theory does not leave the neural event wholly uncaused 
- it being caused by Smith himself - there may yet be another 
wholly uneaused event, viz., Smith's making it happen that p in the 
endeavor to make it happen that q. To forestall such an objection, 
Chisholm states it as an axiom that if S makes it happen that p in the 
endeavor to make it happen that q, then S makes it happen that he 
makes it happen that p in the endeavor to make it happen that q in 
the endeavor to make it happen that q.2 (i.e., Mp,qDM(Mp,q),q. 
Here, as throughout, I omit temporal qualifiers in the interest of  
simplicity.) This axiom naturally has the consequence that there is 
an indefinitely large set of  "nested" events each of which is agent- 
caused but presumably not event-caused. It is not clear that there is 
any a priori objection to such an infinite set of events. 
Let us turn now to a third example. Suppose that Smith raises his 
arm for some further purpose, e.g., to catch the attention of his 
friend. Chisholm would render this situation as follows. 3 Smith 
makes it happen that his arm rises in the endeavor to make it happen 
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(1) that his arm rise, (2)that  his friend's attention be caught, and 
(3) that his arm's rising cause (or causally contribute to) the friend's 
attention being caught. Thus, according to Chisholm, we can explain 
acting for a purpose in terms of two primitive notions, viz., (a) the 
notion of making something happen in the endeavor to make some- 
thing (else) happen, and (b) event-causation. 
Admittedly, not all cases of  acting for a purpose can be handled 
as easily as the foregoing one. Chisholm, with his characteristic 
ingenuity, reminds us of a case which other theories of action have 
found difficult, and proceeds to show how his own theory can 
handle it. Suppose that Smith makes his arm rise for the purpose of 
making it happen that a certain muscle contract, or, as we might say, 
for the purpose of making it happen that a certain muscle "have 
contracted." This cannot be rendered by saying that Smith makes it 
happen that his arm rise in the endeavor that his arm's rising cause 
(or causally contribute to) the contracting of the muscle; for the 
contracting of  the muscle precedes the rising of the arm, or at any 
rate causes it, and this is something which Smith knows and intends. 
Chisholm's rendering of this case is as follows. Smith makes it 
happen that his arm rise in the endeavor to make it happen (1) that 
his arm rise, (2)that  the muscle contract, and (3)that  his making 
something happen in the endeavor to make his arm rise should cause, 
or causally contribute to, the muscle's contracting. This solves the 
problem beautifully. For Smith does endeavor to make it happen 
that a certain endeavoring of his - the exact nature of which he may 
not know - should cause the contracting of the muscle. Since this 
endeavoring includes the occurrence of an earlier neural event, it is 
reasonable for Smith to have such an endeavor. 
In numerous suggestive articles, Chisholm proceeds to explicate a 
large number of action expressions, using only the primitive 
locutions which we have mentioned (or slightly revised versions of 
these locutions). Among the expressions which he explicates are the 
following: 'S intentionally causally contributes to its happening that 
q,' 'S makes it happen that q and his doing so is a basic act," 'S 
makes it happen that q and does so lust in the way in which he 
intends,' and 'It is within S's power to undertake to make it happen 
that q.' A full appreciation of the richness of his theory requires an 
appreciation of his treatment of these locutions. But for present 
purposes, let us content ourselves with the sketch of the theory I 
have presented to this point. 
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2. The Concept of Agent-Causation 
In assessing the theory we must obviously assess the main distinc- 
tive concept to which Chisholm appeals, the concept of agent- 
causation. It is difficult to assess this concept, however, since 
Chisholm offers no definition or analysis of it. I am sure that many 
of his readers, myself included, are somewhat puzzled by this 
notion. As usual, Chisholm himself anticipates the puzzles or 
questions of his readers. One is inclined to ask, says Chisholm, what 
the difference is between the mere occurrence  or happening of an 
undetermined event and its being caused by an agent. Chisholm 
replies that the only answer than can be given is that an event which 
merely happens is a completely uncaused event, whereas an event 
which is caused by an agent is not uncaused. 4 But this reply is 
obviously not very satisfying. To say that the undetermined event is 
n o t  u n c a u s e d  is equivalent to saying that it is either event-caused or 
agent-caused. But, by hypothesis, it is not event-caused, so this 
comes down to saying that it is agent-caused; and this is precisely 
what we seek to have explained. 
Chisholm seems to concede that the concept of agen t -or  
immanent-causation is somewhat unclear. But he contends that it is 
no m o r e  unc lear  than the concept of event-causation: I fred this 
contention unpersuasive. Though there is no universally accepted 
analysis of event-causation, a number of analyses have at least been 
undertaken, analyses that involve either natural laws, counter- 
factnals, or "conditions" of some sort. By contrast, nothing what- 
ever has been offered by Chisholm, even as a rough or approximate 
explication of  the concept of agent-causation. Now perhaps 
Chisholm's position is that the concept of agent-causation need not 
be explicated or analyzed in order to be understood. Perhaps he 
contends that we can understand this concept by a sort of intro- 
spection, even if this understanding cannot be articulated in the 
form of  an analysis or definition. In this connection he approvingly 
quotes Thomas Reid to the effect that the concept of  agent- 
causation is logically and epistemologically prior to that of event- 
causation, e Reid says: " . . .  the conception of an efficient cause may 
very probably be derived from the experience we have had .... of  
our own power to produce certain effects." I would reply to this by 
arguing that the experience of our p o w e r  to produce effects is only 
the experience of the propensity of our desires or  i n t e n t i o n s  to 
produce corresponding effects. Thus, contrary to what Reid and 
Chisholm maintain, the concept of the power of  an agent is 
derivative from the concept of event-causation. 
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There is, moreover, an apparent anomaly in the notion of  pure 
agent-causation, and this anomaly must be explained away if the 
notion is to be legitimized. In every other case in which a substance 
is a cause, some event or state of  affairs involving that substance is 
an event-cause o f  the same effect. (Notice that I do not say, with 
Broad, that a statement ascribing causation to a substance is always 
an ellipsis for an event-causation statement.) When a stone is cor- 
rectly said to be the cause o f  a window's breaking, there is some 
event or state of  affairs involving the stone - e.g., its striking the 
window with a certain force or momentum - which is an event- 
cause o f  the window's breaking. But according to Chisholm, pure 
agent-causation is unaccompanied by event-causation. There appears 
to be an anomaly here that calls for explanation. Pending an 
explanation, one is entitled to be suspicious of  the concept's 
legitimacy. 
3. Responsibility and Determinism 
If Chisholm's solution to the problem of  responsibility leaves one 
unhappy or discontent, it is natural to try to retrace the steps that 
led to this proposed solution. In particular, one is inclined to 
reconsider the argument that suggested an incompatibility between 
responsibility and determinism. Chisholm maintains that a man is 
not responsible for an action unless he could have done otherwise, 
and that if the deed was causally determined by prior events, even 
such events as his own desires and beliefs, then he could not have 
done otherwise. The traditional reply by the reconciliationist, how- 
ever, is that the statement "He could have done otherwise" is 
compatible with the truth of  determinism. The reconcialiationist's 
main "strategem," as Chisholm presents the position, 7 is to say that 
the expression 
(A) He could have done otherwise 
means "no more nor less than" 
(B) I f  he had chosen to do otherwise, he would have done 
otherwise. 
This counterfactual can be true even though what he actually did 
was causally determined. Hence, it is argued, there is no incom- 
patibility between determinism and responsibility. 
Chisholm attacks this reconciliationist "strategem" by arguing 
that (B) is not a correct translation o f  (A). Suppose, he says, that 
statement 
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(C) He could have chosen to do otherwise 
is false. Then even though (B) is true, (A) will be false. But if there is 
a possible case in which (A) is false though (B) is true, then (B) 
doesn't entail (A). Hence (B) is not a correct translation of (A). 
There are two rejoinders I wish to make to this argument. First, I 
suggest that we should not be too hasty in conceding that 
Chisholm's argument demonstrates that (B) is not a correct trans- 
lation of (A). Second, even if we do concede this point, it does not 
in the least follow that reconciliationism is mistaken, that responsi- 
bility is incompatible with determinism. 
I take up the first point first. Is it clear that (A) must be false 
when (B) is true but (C) false? Surely this depends on the senses of 
'could' in (A) and (C). It is clear enough that there are some senses 
of 'could' in which the falsity of (C) implies the falsity of (A), at 
least if we make a further assumption, viz., that his choosing to do 
otherwise is a (causally) necessary condition of his doing otherwise. 
Specifically, i f  (A) either means or implies "It was not causally 
determined that he not do otherwise," and if(C) means "It was not 
causally determined that he not choose to do otherwise," then the 
falsity of (C) implies tha falsity of (A) (at least if we make the 
further assumption mentioned a moment ago). But of course it 
cannot legitimately be assumed that (A) either means or implies "It 
was not causally determined that he not do otherwise," for this is 
one of the very points at issue. 
Perhaps, in advancing the argument against the reconciliationist's 
"strategem," Chisholm thinks that in every sense of "could," the 
falsity of (C) implies the falsity of  (A). He might be assuming a 
general modal principle, governing every use of "could," or at least 
every conceivably relevant use of 'could,' that if Y is a causally 
necessary condition for the occurrence of X, then the falsity of 
(P) Y could have occurred 
entails the falsity of 
(Q) X could have occurred. 
A bit of reflection reveals, however, that this is not true in general. 
Consider 
(A') The sugar could have dissolved in the water. 
Assume that the sugar's being immersed in the water is a causally 
necessary condition of the sugar's dissolving in the water. None- 
theless, it is not at all obvious that the falsity of 
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(C') The sugar could have been immersed in the water 
entails the falsity of (A'). There seems to be at least one way of 
understanding (A') such that its truth is compatible with the falsity 
of (C'). A standard way of interpreting (A') is as 
(B') If the sugar had been immersed in the water, it would 
have dissolved. 
On this interpretation, (A') is compatible with the falsity of (C'). 
Thus, Chisholm cannot claim that the sort of entailment in question 
holds for every sense of "could" without running into conflict with 
one standard use of the phrase "could have." Unless he can show on 
independent grounds that this counterfactual sense of "could have" 
is not appropriate to the "could have" of  agency, he is not entitled 
to assume that the falsity of (C)entails the falsity of  (A). 
However, let us grant for the sake of argument that (B) is not a 
correct translation of (A), and for the very reason Chisholm gives, 
i.e., that (B) does not entail (A). Does it follow from this, as 
Chisholm seems to think, that responsibility is incompatible with 
determinism? Not at all. From the fact that this one attempted 
translation of (A) fails it does not follow that all other recon- 
ciliationist attempts to translate (A) would fail. Although (B) may 
not be equivalent to (A), there may be another statement com- 
patible with determinism which is equivalent to (A). Indeed, 
although (B) itself is not equivalent to (A), it may be one conjunct 
of a conjunction that is equivalent to (A). Indeed, as far as 
Chisholm's argument goes, it could turn out that (A) is equivalent to 
the conjunction of  (B) and (C). To be sure, if such a conjunction is 
to save the day for the reconciliationist, he must make out the claim 
that the "could" in (C) is compatible with determinism. (C) must 
not mean or imply "It was not causally determined that he not 
choose to do otherwise." But this is certainly an open possibility, 
which Chisholm has not eliminated. Thus, Chisholm has not really 
established that there is no correct reconciliationist translation of 
(A). At most he has shown, what many people are prepared to grant, 
that (B)by itself is not a correct translation of (A). 
4. Responsibility and Agent-Causation 
Defenders of reconciliationism have typically been on the defen- 
sive against arguments of the sort Chisholm presents. If I may be 
allowed a football metaphor, a lot of "playing time" is spent with 
the reconciliationist near his own goal line, trying to protect it 
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against the assaults of  his foes. Occasionally, it is true, he mounts an 
offensive. For example, he contends against the indeterminist that 
actions which are wholly uncaused or fortuitous cannot be respon- 
sible. But this will not work against Chisholm, who claims that 
actions are caused, but only caused by agents. 
What I shall now try to do is launch a more concerted offensive 
against Chisholm's account. I shall argue that Chisholm's combi- 
nation of agent-causation but not event-causation yields a thor- 
oughly unsatisfactory treatment of responsibility. 
Let me first point out that many statements of responsibility are 
future-oriented.  In the debate over free will, philosophers have 
focused too heavily on backward-looking ascriptions of responsi- 
bility, and this emphasis, I think, is misplaced. W.e often make 
someone responsible for bringing about a certain future event, or for 
performing a future action. We charge him now, for example, with 
the responsibility of getting the dishes washed before the company 
arrives, or with locking the building when everyone has gone home. 
Such assignments of responsibility are widely regarded as reasonable 
and in order, even by those to whom such responsibility is given. But 
would such assignments of  responsibility be in order if Chisholm's 
theory of action were true, that is, if actions were never caused by 
events or states of  affairs? I think not. (It is not quite accurate to 
say that, according to Chisholm, actions are never caused by events 
or states of affairs. He admits that desires sometimes necessitate 
actions. On these occasions, however, Chisholm would say that the 
agent is not responsible for his actions. Since we are only interested 
in cases where the agent is responsible, and since, according to 
Chisholm, these are cases where the actions are not caused by events 
or states of  affairs, I shall assume for simplicity that, according to 
Chisholm, no  actions are caused by events or states of  affairs.) 
Suppose that Smith is responsible for performing action A at a 
future time t. Smith believes, however, and has good reason to 
believe, that no matter what plans or intentions he forms to do 
action A, there will be no grounds for believing that he will succeed 
in performing it. No matter what preliminary steps he takes, no 
matter what forethought and devotion he gives to it, he has no 
reason to think he will succeed in doing it. In particular, suppose 
that Smith believes (and has good reason to believe) that whether or 
not action A is performed does not depend on any of his intentions, 
either prior to t or at t. There is no reason to believe that an inten- 
tion to do A, either prior to t or at t, will lead to, or result in, his 
doing A. Furthermore, suppose that Smith knows that whether or 
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not action A is performed depends on some powerful and alien 
force, which would not and could not be affected by any of his 
plans or intentions. No matter what Smith's intentions might be, this 
powerful force could see to it that an entirely different action 
would be performed. If Smith knew these things, I suggest, he would 
feel very insecure about his position. He has been charged with 
executing a certain task. He feels an obligation to do it, perhaps, and 
fears penalties for non-fulfillment. But the matter appears to be 
entirely out of  his hands, beyond his control. It would be natural for 
Smith, in such a situation, to seek to be relieved from his responsi- 
bility; and a sympathetic observer would surely support such a plea 
on his part. It would be unreasonable, in the circumstances, to hold 
Smith responsible for executing the task in question. 
Now I wish to argue that if Chisholm is right about action and 
agency, that if no actions are ever event-caused, but are only agent- 
caused, then anyone charged with an obligation would essentially be 
in Smith's situation. But in this kind of situation it is unreasonable 
to hold a person under an obligation, to make him responsible. 
Hence, Chisholm's theory is incompatible with responsibility, at 
least the forward-looking kind of responsibility that I have been 
discussing. 
What is my reason for saying that, if Chisholm is right, we are 
always in Smith's situation? Well, according to Chisholm, no action 
is ever caused by events or states of affairs. It follows from this that 
they are never caused by the agent's intentions or choices, which are 
events or states of affairs. It is true that Chisholm uses such 
locutions as "S acts with the intention of bringing about a." But this 
is talk of  acting with an intention, not acting as a result of an 
intention. As far as I can see, the fact that S has a current intention, 
or has had a past intention, to do action A at this moment is no 
reason at all to think that he will do A at this moment. Whether or 
not he does A is causally dependent only on an agent, and hence not 
at all, according to Chisholm, on a state of  affairs such as an 
intention. If  the agent causes him to act in a way that accords with 
the intention, then presumably he will have acted with that inten- 
tion. But, given that he has that intention, it is still entirely open to 
the agent to cause him to act quite contrary to that intention. The 
intention itself in no way determines what the action will be. 
Now in describing Smith's situation, I spoke of Smith's action as 
being dependent on a powerful and "alien" force. Is this a legitimate 
expression to use? Chisholm would doubtless reject it as inappro- 
priate. The "force" on which action depends is not at all "alien," 
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Chisholm would hasten to say, but Smith himself! How can Smith 
himself be an "alien" force? ! My reply to this - which I can only 
sketch here, and not defend in detail - is that the denial of  causal 
relations between intentions and actions serves to undermine our 
notion of the self and of personal identity over time. I would 
contend that the notion of identity of  an object over time partly 
involves the presupposition that earlier states of  the object make 
causal contributions to its later states. The sense one has of one's self 
as a continuing entity presupposes the idea that one's present mental 
states should have some causal effect on future mental states, and 
that these in turn should have causal effects on one's action. To 
deny the causal dependence of one's actions on one's choices and 
intentions, either present or preceding, is to do violence to our 
conception of the self as an agent. If these causal dependences are 
severed, as Chisholm's theory would apparently sever them, I have 
doubts that we could recognize the self in the wreckage. Certainly I 
cannot feel confident that Smith's present self, which now intends 
to do a certain later action, is or will be identical with that so-called 
"agent" which Chisholm says will be the cause of future action, 
quite independent of any desires or intentions that crop up at any 
point during this period. 
It is worth pointing out that Chisholm's own definition of 
intention, which appears in an article not dealing with the meta- 
physics of  agency, seems to run afoul of his own theory of agency. 
In the 1970 paper, "The Structure of  Intention," Chisholm offers 
the following definition: 
S has the intention at t of  bringing it about that q = df 
At a time prior to t S intended something as a preliminary step 
toward his bringing it about that q, and from that time on he 
has confidently believed that he will make an attempt to bring 
it about that q and that he will succeed.S 
When I say that this def'mition "runs afoul" of  Chisholm's own 
theory of agency, I do not mean that the definition cannot be satis- 
fied if his theory of  agency is correct. I mean something slightly 
weaker. I mean that if a person is rational, and if he accepts 
Chisholm's theory of  action and agency, then he will never satisfy 
the definition, for he will never have an intention, according to the 
definition. To see why, consider the second part of  the definition, 
which says that S confidently believes that he will make an attempt 
to bring it about that q. If  S accepts Chisholm's theory of action and 
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agency, he will not be justified in confidently believing that he will 
make any particular attempt in the future. The only thing that could 
justify such confidence is some belief about the causal connection 
between present states of affairs and future actions (or attempts). 
But since, according to Chisholm's theory, no future action (at least 
no responsible action) would be caused by present states of  affairs, 
there would never be any justification for such confidence. Hence, a 
rational person would not have such confidence, and therefore, 
according to the definition, would not have any intention. 
For the same reasons that a (rational) man will never intend 
anything, according to Chisholm's theory, he w~l also never engage 
in deliberation. The only point of deliberation is to form a current 
intention, on the presupposition that this intention will bring about 
future action. But if Chisholm's theory is correct, there will never be 
any grounds for this presupposition, and hence no rational person 
will engage in deliberation. We see, then, that Chisholm's theory, so 
far from preserving the possibility of responsibility, intention, and 
defiberation, has the effect of undermining the possibility of such 
states of affairs. 
5. Causal and Non-Causal Connections 
Until now I have been arguing that Chisholm makes too little use 
of event-causation: his denial of event-causation for a certain range 
of phenomena yields a theory of action that conflicts with certain 
desiderata for such a theory. [ wish now, however, to turn to a 
different point. What I wish to argue is that Chisholm tries, in a 
certain part of his theory, to make too much use of  event-causation. 
It should be noted that the foregoing points which I raised 
concentrated on certain global features of Chisholm's theory. This is 
not only because these global features are important, nor because it 
is those features of the theory with which I most disagree, but also 
because it is so difficult to criticize the details of Chisholm's theory. 
As always, Chisholm has developed his theory with precision and 
attention to detail. His development of  the fundamental philo- 
sophical ideas is carried out with great subtlety and thoroughness. 
Hence, there are relatively few points of  detail on which to fault 
him, at least that I can fred. Nonetheless, let me mention one 
relatively minor problem which I think his theory does not handle 
adequately. 
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The problem I have in mind concerns the analysis of  the concept 
of adopting one state of  affairs as a means to another state of  affairs. 
We saw earlier that Chisholm tries to analyse the locution 'S makes p 
happen with the purpose of making q happen' with the use of  only 
two primitive concepts: (1)making something happen in the 
endeavor to make something happen, and (2)event-causation. Now 
in the 1970 paper on intention, he uses a slightly different primitive 
locution, but since I am not concerned with that difference, let me 
stick with the older one. He proceeds to give a definition of 'S acts 
with the intention of bringing it about that q and does so in order 
that q.' This definition closely parallels the characterizations of  
making something happen with a purpose, which we discussed 
earlier. A bit later Chisholm proposes to define the notion of adopt- 
ing one state of  affairs as a means to another. What he says is that 
when a man intends to bring about one state of  affairs in order that 
another state of affairs may obtain, then we may also say that the 
fwst state of  affairs is itself a means to the second provided that the 
agent believes that it (the first state of affairs), as distinguished from 
his bringing it about, will causally contribute to the second. 9 What I 
wish to argue now is that this definition is too narrow for Chisholm's 
purposes, and the reason it is too narrow is that he restricts himself 
to causal contribution. 
The worry I have can be identified with the following example. 
Suppose Smith extends his arm out the car window in order that he 
signal for a turn. It seems natural to me to say, in addition, that 
Smith adopts the first state of  affairs, viz., his extending his arm out 
the window, as a means to the second, viz., his signaling for a turn. 
But the condition or analysis Chisholm suggests does not cover this 
case. For if we may assume that Smith is rational, he will not believe 
that the state of  affairs which consists in his extending his arm out 
the car window will causally contribute to the state of  affairs which 
consists in his signaling for a turn. The relation between these two 
states of  affairs (or, more precisely, between the obtainings of  these 
states of  affairs) would not be causation, or causal contribution. This 
seems to me evident on the face of it. But ff any arguments are 
needed, I might point out, first, that there is no law of nature that 
would connect expending one's arm with signaling for a turn, and, 
second, that if these states of  affairs were to obtain they would 
obtain simultaneously, which appears to rule out causal connection. 
To handle this case, I think that Chisholm needs to expand his 
concept of the sorts of  ways states of  affairs can be related to one 
another, or, more precisely, the ways their obtainings can be related 
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to one another.  The not ion o f  a conventional connection is what 
seems to be required to handle the signaling case. But other  kinds o f  
connections must be countenanced to handle other  kinds o f  cases. I 
have a t tempted  to work out  such non-causal concepts in another 
context ,  and shall not  repeat those suggestions here.  1~ I will content  
myself with the simple point  that  Chisholm cannot succeed in doing 
everything he wants to do i f  he confines himself  to the two resources 
he selects, viz., one of  his primitive teleological locutions and the 
concept o f  event-causation. But to say that  he cannot  do  everything 
he wants to do with these resources is not  to deny the impressive 
amount  of  terr i tory he has been able to cover with these resources, 
nor to minimize the importance o f  that achievement.  
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About Agency" (SPAA), in Karel Lambert, ed., The Logical Way of  
Doing Th/n~, New Haven: Yale University Press 0969); "On the Logic 
of Intentional Action" (LIA), in Robert Binkeley, et al., eds., Agent, 
Action and Reason, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1971); and 
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No. 19 (October 8, 1970), pp. 633-647. 
See SPAA, p. 206, and LIA, p. 47. 
See FA, pp. 35-36, and LIA, pp. 55ff. 
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Ibid., pp. 638-639. 
See A Theory of  H u ~  Action, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
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